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An inmate at a federal penal institution "is entitled only to be released
after full service of his sentence less good time earned during incarceration."'
He or she is not entitled to parole, for parole is not a right but a privilege,2
a matter of "legislative grace".' The United States Board of Parole has
"absolute discretion" 4 in deciding whether and when to grant parole. The
judiciary will not interfere with the Board, as "courts are without power to
grant a parole or to determine judicially eligibility for parole."5 And since
the Board is statutorily authorized6 to exercise broad discretion, and its
"conclusions . . . are based upon numerous determinations of fact, and,
more important, judgment, which in turn are influenced by personal
observations that cannot be brought before a reviewing court,"7 a "hands
off" approach to judicial review of parole release decisionmaking has seemed
warranted.8
If, however, the above reasoning can be demonstrated to be invalid, and
other forces militating toward a "hands off" policy are shown to be less
than compelling, then non-reviewability of Board determinations would be
neither desirable nor possible.
Entitlement theory
Although an inmate may not be "entitled" to leave prison prior to the
expiration of his judicially imposed sentence (less good time), Congress
has provided him a means for doing so. The United States Board of
Parole "may in its discretion authorize the release of [a prisoner] on
parole" if it concludes that "there is a reasonable probability that such
prisoner will live and remain at liberty without violating the laws, and if
in the opinion of the Board such release is not incomp,atible with the
welfare of society. . . .'
Parold Board statistics indicate that in fiscal 1970 nearly forty
percent of the releases from federal penal institutions were parolees.'0 Board
figures are fiscal years 1966-1970 demonstrate that from 41.5% (1966) to 56.2%
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(1969) of those annually considered for parole were in fact paroled."
Percentages from fiscal 1972 illustrate that average time served for all
prisoners is slightly above one-half of the judicially imposed sentence, while
inmates released on parole serve, on an average, 37.9% of their sentences.' 2
Thus one may fairly conclude that prisoners have a legitimate
expectation of gaining release on parole. Although it has been argued that
the above-mentioned figures demonstrate a reasonable reliance on parole -
such reliance taking on the color of a right' 3-it is doubtful that the
judiciary could find that such an expectation, based upon statistics unrelated
to any particular individual, is an interest to be accorded the full panoply of
due process protections. But, at a minimum, considerations of "rightness and
fairness"' 4 should require the institution of "fair" procedures and judicial
review of Parole Board decisionmaking.
Although parole is not considered an "entitlement", it is viewed as "an
integral and vigorous part of our modern penological system",' 5 an aspect of
prison discipline and hence a part of the "rehabilitative process'"'.16 As such,
parole has a direct and significant impact upon prison behavior. To ensure
that inmates are treated fairly, which is essential for prison morale,
discipline and rehabilitation,' 7 parole release decisionmaking must be
efficient as well as equitable. To ensure that it is, courts must be available
for review of parole release decisions.' 8
Several important interests are safeguarded by judicial review: the
government's interest in efficiency and the ends promoted by fairness;
society's interest, generally, in the fair treatment of individuals and the
avoidance of arbitrary decisions or decisions based on erroneous
information; and the prisoner's interest, at least his "legitimate
expectation", in conditional liberty.' 9  Thus, protection of these interests
and basic fairness strongly suggest that abandonment of the "entitlement"
theory is appropriate.
Rejection of the "right-privilege" distinction
Determination of "what procedures due process may require under any
given set of circumstances" 20 depends, not upon whether a right or privilege
is at stake,2' but upon the "extent to which an individual will be
condemned to suffer grievous loss." 22 Traditionally due process protections
obtain when one is about to be "deprived" of an "interest" which is
"presently enjoyed".2 3 Inmates seeking parole may not fit into this
framework," for deprivation connotes something presently enjoyed, which is
about to be lost "because of what the government is doing to him".25 A
prisoner's interest in parole - "conditional liberty" - seems at best to be a
legitimate expectation, something to which due process has not been
heretofore extended.26
Nevertheless a prisoner s interest in prospective parole has been accorded
due process protections by the judiciary.?? Relying on Morrissey v. Brewer
(requiring that minimal due process safeguards attach during the parole
revocation process),2 8 United States ex rel. Johnson v. Chairman of New
York State Board of Parole,29 held that "a prisoner's interest in prospective
parole or 'conditional entitlement' " must be treated, in like fashion, as a
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parolee's interest in continued conditional freedom. "To hold otherwise
would be to create a distinction too gossamer-thin to stand close analysis.
Whether the immediate issue be release or revocation, the stakes are the
same: conditional freedom versus incarceration."3 0
Childs v. United States Board of Parole3' applied a similar rationale:
When we examine the nature of the interest of the parolee facing
revocation and that of the parole applicant in the light of the
ultimate effect of the Parole Board's determination, it appears
obvious that the difference is not enough to exclude the applicant
from due process protections. This is so simply because the stakes
are the same, incarceration or conditional freedom.
Candarini v. Attorney General of the United States33 looked to the impact of
a parole denial:
To the inmate a negative decision from the Board surely condemns
him to suffer grievous loss. The inmate's interest in conditional
liberty requires that minimum due process attach.34
In accord is Bradford v. Weinstein.35
Johnson, Childs, Candarini and Bradford upon the substantially
similar interests of the parole applicant and the parolee in conditional
liberty and the "grievous loss" inflicted by an adverse Board decision. Thus,
due process procedural protections were held to apply. The Johnson
analysis, however, may be viewed as an overreaching of Morrissey, leaving
the former's underlying rationale subject to attack. If one looks simply to
the interests at stake, one finds much more than a conceptual difference
between continued incarceration (for the unsuccessful parole applicant) and
revocation of parole (for the unsuccessful parolee). 6 A much better
approach, that used by Johnson, is to examine the "nature"" of the interest
- conditional liberty. When the question is so considered, Johnson is
correct that the stakes in conditional liberty, for the parole applicant and
parolee, are not "qualitatively and quantitatively different". 38
If Johnson's reading of Morrissey is correct, the next question is: What
process is due? Goldberg v. Kelly39 and Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers'
Union v. McElroy,40 provide the method by which an answer is obtained:
Consideration of what procedures due process may require under
any given set of circumstances must begin with a determination of
the precise nature of the government interest involved as well as of
the private interest that has been [or will be] affected by
governmental action.4'
The interest of the government, and the Board of Parole, is primarily
efficiency, as it always is. But since parole is an important part of the
penological system (discipline, morale and rehabilitation), both the
government and the Board have an interest in fair treatment of inmates.
Parole is also an alternative to incarceration, which is expensive; therefore,
government has a financial interest in parole. And, pursuant to its enabling
legislation,42 the Board of Parole has a strong interest in the safety and
welfare of society.
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Against these governmental interests must be weighed the inmate's interests
in the termination of incarceration, the fair and individualized consideration
of his case on its merits, and the avoidance of erroneous determinations.
Absent efficiency (depending upon how that word is defined), the inmate
and the Board have a virtual identity of interests.
Efficiency to the Board may (and probably does) mean speed and
convenience.4 But that kind of efficiency is obtained only at the sacrifice of
the other identified, and significant, interests. Efficiency can and should
mean the absence of undue or unnecessary delays. So considered, efficiency
can accommodate other important interests. On balance, then, the Board's
decisionmaking process should be constructed to assure fair and accurate
decisions and to avoid abuses of discretion."
Morrissey's safeguards, representing the "minimum requirements" of due
process, and providing the guidepost for determination of how much due
process applies to parole release decisionmaking, include:
1. Written notice;
2. Disclosure of adverse evidence;
3. Hearing;
4. Opportunity to present witnesses and documentary evidence;
5. Confrontation and cross-examination;
6. A neutral and detached hearing body; and
7. A written statement of the fact-finders justifying their action.
Presence of counsel is not necessarily required. Wolff v. McDonell45 (applying
some of the Morrissey protections to an in-prison disciplinary proceeding)
found that Morrissey's procedural protections must accommodate a legitimate
and overriding governmental interest in the maintenance of prison
discipline, order and authority. Thus confrontation, cross-examination and
counsel are not required for disciplinary hearings within the prison. How
much due process is necessary in Board decisionmaking lies somewhere
between Morrissey and Wolff.
Following the Wolff rationale, each of Morrissey's procedural protections
would apply, save those which adversely affect the Board's need for
efficiency. An initial determination of procedures which might affect
efficiency must begin with a recitation of the procedures currently observed
by the Board of Parole pursuant to its own Rules and Regulations, for such
rules are a persuasive statement that the adopted procedures are not
disruptive of efficiency.
The Board's rules provide for notice of time and place for parole release
hearings,46 a hearing47 at or before which documentary evidence may be
submitted,4 8 representation by a person of the parole applicant's choice49
(such person may be an attorney, although a lawyer's presence might be
counterproductive),so and a statement by the parole applicant or his
representative.5 The hearing body is, theoretically at least, neutral and
detached and is thought to have an identity of interest with the inmate.5 2 If
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parole is denied, a written statement53 is to be provided explaining the
reasons for the denial. Additionally, the Board's rules provide a checklist of
reasons for which parole may be denied54 and guidelines55 by which
prisoners can estimate their chances of obtaining parole.
Omitted from this list of "musts" is an opportunity to learn of evidence
or information detrimental to the parole applicant,5 6 an opportunity to
challenge such evidence or parties advocating a prisoner's continued
incarceration,5 7 and a statement of legitimate and meaningful reasons for
parole denial.58 Attempts by inmates to secure these procedural protections
were, until Morrissey, generally unsuccessful since the judiciary feared that
incorporation of due process safeguards would impose an unnecessary
burden upon the Board of Parole.59 However, Morrissey "wiped the slate all
but clean", 60 and the courts are gradually, on a case by case basis,
approaching application of the minimal protections guaranteed by
Morrissey.61 (The implications of this trend will be discussed below.) Unless
the Johnson rationale is completely inaccurate and Morrissey, though it
applies to in-prison disciplinary proceedings, is strongly distinguishable from
parole-release hearings, that parole is not a right no longer justifies
invocation of "hands off."
Legislative grace
The demise of the right-privilege distinction and the role played by
parole in "our modern penological system" 62 demonstrate the conceptual
invalidity of a continued invocation of "hands off". The courts have
traditionally been available for review of procedures adopted by the
government to confer 63 or terminate64 its statutorily created benefits. Once the
government decides to confer a benefit, it must do so by means which are
essentially evenhanded and rational.65 Labeling parole an act of grace is but
a substitution of assertion for analysis and in no way justifies insulation of
the parole decisionmaking process from judicial review. That parole is
viewed as an integral part of the rehabilitative process, and is seen as
important to in-prison discipline and as an economic alternative to
incarceration, serves only to emphasize the fact that parole is far more than
an "act of grace" and that the judiciary cannot refuse to oversee the Board
of Parole on such a basis.
A bsolute discretion
If Morrissey v. Brewer "wiped the due process slate all but clean" 66
regarding parole release decisionmaking, the Administrative Procedure Act 67
provides another slate upon which to write. For, irrespective of the extent to
which the Morrissey rationale applies to the procedures utilized by the Board
of Parole, if the Board's exercise of discretion is not absolute, the APA
requires the institution of fair procedures and judicial review of the Board's
actions.68 Whether the Board's discretion is, in fact, absolute is not simply a
question of semantics. It is, rather, determinative of the power of the Board.
Regarding the institution of statutorily prescribed procedures, whether
the Board's power is absolute or merely broad does not seem to be of
consequence. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in King v.
United States6i9 held that the Board of Parole was an "agency" within the
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meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act and that at least a portion of
the Act's provisions were to apply to the Board.70 (Accord, the 10th Circuit
in Mower v. Britton7 ). The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
in Pickus v. United States Board of Parole72 held that the rule-making
provisions of the APA apply to the Board. Both King and Pickus limited
the impact of an earlier decision in the D.C. Circuit, Hyser v. Reed, holding
that the APA did not apply to the Board because the Board of Parole did
not "adjudicate, after hearing"." Both cases also have stimulated the Board
to action74 and laid the groundwork for more significant challenge to the
Board's authority - challenges in an area where the absolute-broad
distinction in discretion is crucial.
Pursuant to sections 701-706 of the Administrative Procedure Act,7 5
actions of an "agency" or "authority of the Government of the United
States" are subject to judicial review, save those agency actions exempted by
§701(a). Unless judicial review has been precluded by statute, 6 or "agency
action is committed to agency discretion by law," 77 "[a] person suffering a
legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by
agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute is entitled to judicial
review thereof." 78
"Exemptions from the . . . Administrative Procedure Act are not lightly
to be presumed."79 Rather, there is a presumption of reviewability.80
Although the Board of Parole consistently argues to the contrary, there is no
indication that Congress intended to restrict judicial review under
§701(c)(1)." More compelling however, is the assertion that Board action is
not subject to review pursuant to §701(c)(2). For the Board "may in its
discretion" authorize parole release if it concludes that a parole applicant
has been rehabilitated and his release from prison is not inimical to the
interests of society.82
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe8 3 indicates that, to determine
whether agency action is within the §701(c)(2) exemption, one should, first,
examine closely the manner in which, statutorily and actually, discretion is
to be exercised. Statutorily, Congress has not provided much guidance.84 On
a theoretical level, it is presumed that several factors are to be considered:
institutional conduct, nature of the offense, probability of reform, age, prior
associations, habits, inclinations and traits of character, the impact upon
public security of an inmate's release, and many psychological and
sociological factors detected and evaluated by the prison staff.85 The
complexity and importance of these factors is thought to be such that only
experienced penologists can accurately determine the optimum moment at
which parole should be granted. Thus it would seem entirely appropriate tofind the Board of Parole's action within the §701(a)(2) exemption.
Unfortunately, the theory of the Board's decisionmaking is not consistent
with reality. An overwhelming majority of decisions to release on parole are
made within guidelines recently adopted by the Board of Parole.86
The Guidelines themselves represent an abandonment by the Parole
Board of its . . . pose of expertise in the area of rehabilitation and
the Board no longer claims to act on information not before the(trial) court at sentencing. By placing primary reliance on the
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Guidelines in its release decisions, the [United States Board of
Parole] has shifted its orientation from rehabilitation to achieving
relatively longer incapacitation of likely recidivists, and to furthering
the 'punitive' functions of deterrence, retribution and denunciation."8 7
By exercising its authority in this fashion, the Board has removed any
compelling justification for complete judicial deference to the judgment of
the Board of Parole.
After scrutinizing the manner in which an agency exercises its discretion,
Overton Park suggests a second inquiry. "The legislative history of the
Administration Procedure Act indicates that it [§701(c)(2)] is applicable in
those rare instances where 'statutes are drawn in such broad terms that in a
given case there is no law to apply'."8 8 To determine whether there is law to
apply, one must look to 18 U.S.C. §4203, which contemplates that the Board
will be concerned with considerations of rehabilitation. As stated above, the
Guidelines are a persuasive statement that the Board is not so concerned and
does not pretend to be. Rather, the Board has disregarded its statutory
purpose and is concerned chiefly with ensuring that "similar persons are
dealt with in similar ways in similar situations."89
Adoption of and reliance upon the Guidelines has placed the Board in a
dilemma. On the one hand, the Board has "abandon[ed] rehabilitation as a
primary goal of the parole system" and "eliminate[d] a major justification
for the existence of the parole system as a second stage in the decision as to
length of incarceration,"90 thereby removing any need for judicial deference
to the Board's expertise. On the other hand, the Guidelines represent a clear
departure from the Board's statutory mandate and permit a reviewing court
to determine
where the Board has arrogated to itself decisions properly made
only by the legislature, when the Board's decision in a case is
inconsistent with its statutory directives, when improper criteria are
used, or when its decision has no basis in the prisoner's file.91
Thus, the Board has removed from itself any need or rational reason to find
§701(c)(2) applicable to its actions - providing, as it were, a crack in its
own door through which judicial review under the APA might enter.
Courts lack power to determine eligibility for or grant parole
The fact that the judiciary has neither the power nor the expertise to make
decisions about an inmate's suitability for parole has very little to do with an
examination of the procedures utilized by the Board of Parole. Judicial
oversight requires nothing more than insistence that the Board
comply with its enabling statute and the Constitution, that its procedures
are neither arbitrary nor capricious and that it adheres to its own rules and
regulations.92
A judge need not be an expert in penology to determine whether the
Board is within or without its statutory mandate, whether its procedures
meet the standards imposed by the Administrative Procedure Act or by due
process, whether the Board's actions are in compliance with 28 CFR Pt. 2,
or whether such actions constitute an abuse of discretion. These are tasks
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with which judges are familiar.93 And it misses the issue entirely to say that
because a court may not, due to a lack of expertise or power, grant parole it
must leave a parole applicant to the tender mercies of the Board of Parole.
Exercise of the Board's discretion requires a peculiar expertise
The Board of Parole, pursuant to 28 CFR §2.19, purports to consider
several factors in deciding whether and where to grant parole. Several of
these factors do involve matters of judgment and observation difficult for
evaluation by a reviewing court. In point of fact, however, the overwhelming
majority - over 90% - of parole release decisions are made pursuant to and
within the Board's guidelines, 28 CFR §2.20. 9 The guidelines consider very
little, if anything, which was not available to the trial judge at sentencing.
With the Board's rejection of expertise - explicit in usage of the guidelines
- the Board has also rejected any necessity for courts to defer the Board's
judgments.
The above fairly demonstrates that determinations of the Board of Parole
may be reviewed by the judiciary, and that some elements of due process
and the Administrative Procedure Act apply to Board actions and procedures.
A next step, and one which is to be surveyed below, is an attack upon the
reasons for a denial of parole.
After King v. United States95 and United States ex rel. Johnson v.
Chairman of New York State Board of Parole96 and promulgation of 28
CFR 32.13,,9 a statement of reasons is to be given for the denial of a parole
application. Written reasons serve several important purposes:
To require the decision-maker to articulate his reasons focuses in
him an awareness that his discretion must be exercised in a
principled and consistent way. A statement of reasons may promote,
as well, the rehabilitative goals of the parole system, since
informing the prisoner of the reasons for denying him parole is an
obvious first step toward enabling him to conform his institutional
conduct to proper standards, should such issue be before the Board.
[We] note . . . that society has a further interest in treating the
potential parolee with basic fairness: fair treatment in parole
denials will enhance the chance of rehabilitation by avoiding
reactions to arbitrariness.98
And most importantly, for immediate purposes:
.0..a statement of reasons will permit the reviewing court to
determine whether the Board has adopted and followed criteria that
are appropriate, rational and consistent, and also protect the inmate
against arbitrary and capricious decisions or actions based upon
impennissible considerations?
A convenient and logical starting point is provided by the Board's Rules
and Regulations. As discussed above, the Board notifies prisoners eligible
and applying for parole that there will be a "hearing" (the term "hearing"
is really a euphemism - "appearance" would more accurately describe the
reality of the situation), and the date and location at which he, or a
representative of his choice, may speak or present documentary evidence.
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After the hearing, the examiners orally inform the parole applicant of their
decision - which is not final. Within a short period of time - fifteen
working days - the inmate is to receive official word of the Board's
decision. This decision is in written form and, if parole has been denied, is
accompanied by a statement of the grounds of decision.
Parole applicants are not entitled to the effective presence of an attorney,
may not have access to adverse information in their files, may not challenge
statements or documents detrimental to their chances for parole, nor are they
often told of the real reason for parole denials. 00 Each of these deprivations
provides a means by which a parole denial may be challenged.
Presence of effective counsel
Counsel, per se, is not excluded from the parole decisionmaking process.
But if a parole applicant chooses to have counsel present, the attorney's role
is limited. Section 2.12 of the Board's regulations permits him only to offer
a statement to or answer questions of the hearing examiners. Section 2.22
requires attorneys and others seeking a personal interview with a Board
representative to submit a written request to the Board "setting forth the
nature of the information to be discussed".
The reasoning which does not allow counsel to participate as an
adversary is grounded in the assumption that the parole hearing is not
adversarial;101 the inmate and Board have an identity of interest'0 2 and the
Board makes no finding of fact.' 03 This reasoning is fallacious.
To the extent that the Board seeks to encourage and foster an inmate's
rehabilitation and readjustment, it is not his adversary. However,
rehabilitation is no longer a significant factor in determining an inmate's date
of release. Since more than ninety per cent of all parole releases are within
the Guidelines period, and only those release decisions which are outside the
Guidelines are subject to review,o'0 at least those inmates whose Guideline
sentence does not call for parole at the time of Board consideration are in
an adversarial relationship with the hearing examiners. In a very real sense,
a prisoner must argue why deviation from the Guidelines is warranted. If
the examiners are persuaded by an inmate's presentation, they must either
justify their result'05 or interpret the Guidelines to correspond with their
decision.106 The former result seems unsavory to the examiners 0 7 while the
latter calls for less than exemplary behavior. In either case the actions of the
hearing examiners are not conducive to rehabilitation and place the inmate
in an adversarial posture - one in which he does need an effective voice in
his behalf.
Secondly, there is not often an identity of interest between inmate and
Parole Board. The former hopes to serve as little time as possible, while thq
Board is, statutorily, to release an inmate only when, in its opinion, he will
neither commit further crimes nor pose a menace to society. Additionally,
the Guidelines seek to correct disparities in sentencing, add predictability to
institutional life and serve a multitude of other interests, virtually all of
which do not necessarily correspond to an inmate's desire to leave prison as
soon as possible.
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Finally it is thought that the Board is not concerned with a sorting or
evaluation of facts. However, the Parole Policy Guidelines'0 8 are a persuasive
statement to the contrary. Since all federal offenses are not mentioned in the
"severity offense behavior" list, the inmate's explanation of the crime may
well determine how serious the hearing examiners regard his criminal
conduct. The salient factor score also requires resolution of fact. These two
categories - offense severity and salient factor - automatically determine
the length of an inmate's sentence. An error of fact, or computation, can
mean an additional year, or even years, of incarceration.
Additionally, the Board considers what it terms "mitigating and
aggravating factors" surrounding the commission of an offense. 09 Those
factors are of paramount importance to a prisoner who plea-bargained,
against whom criminal charges had been dropped, or about whom there
were allegations of other criminal activities. The Board often considers not
only the offense for which an inmate has been convicted and is incarcerated,
but also alleged crimes." 0 The result can be an increase in offense severity
and a concomitant increase in time to be served. Not only is it unfair to
punish a man for an offense of which he has not been convicted, but
ignorance of this Board practice, for example, may well vitiate an otherwise
valid guilty plea under Rule 11, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure."'
Even though it would seem to be of benefit to the Board, the inmate
and society (in view of their respective interests in fair and accurate parole
release decisionmaking) to have counsel present at Board hearings to act as a
proponent of the parole applicant's cause, the Board is of the position that
any gains which might result from this procedure are more than outweighed
by strains on administrative time, manpower and money."2 The Board is
undoubtedly correct - in a sense. Hearings might become more time-
consuming, require more, or more qualified, hearing examiners and create a
need for a larger budget. But convenience is not of paramount importance -
a correct and equitable decision in each individual case is. So the question
becomes not whether the presence of an advocate for an inmate detracts from
Board efficiency, but whether such presence helps to ensure that the Board
does not make mistakes.
Before indicating the means by which presence of an advocate can be
introduced into parole release decisionmaking, it is important to emphasize
two points: (1) Counsel's presence, or the presence of a personal
representative, is already permitted by the Board's regulations;" and (2) To
argue that an inmate is to be allowed the presence of an advocate is not to
argue that he is to be guaranteed counsel as of right. This is a distinction
which the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit failed to grasp in
Menechino v. Oswald."4  Whether this advocate must be an attorney, or
whether the state must provide indigents with counsel, is another, though
not unrelated, matter.
Morrissey v. Brewer,"5 Gagnon v. Scarpelli,"6 and Wolff v. McDonnelU"
indicate that minimum due process is not satisfied by the limited role
permitted an advocate by current Board rules. The advocate, to effectively
assist a parole applicant, is to be made aware of data relevant to the
inmate's suitability for parole, and be accorded an opportunity to discuss
and challenge information in the inmate's file and present and argue
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evidence favorable to him. Section 555 of the Administrative Procedure Act (a
portion of which, §555(c) already applies to the Board" 8 ), would also require
the Board to permit, with due regard to "the orderly conduct of [its]
business", an inmate's representative, whether or not an attorney, to act as
an advocate. 19
Thus parole release decisionmaking, which denies an applicant an
effective voice in his own behalf, is contrary to the requirements of
minimum due process and the statutory dictates of the APA. In addition,
such procedure is not in harmony with the procedural protections accorded
at sentencing.2 0 Counsel is required at sentencing to ensure that rights are
not waived by a defendant, to ensure factual accuracy, to argue for minimal
punishment, and to present the defendent in the best light possible. Mempha
v. Rhay121 is thought to be inapplicable to parole release decisionmakingl 22
because, for example, the Board's function is not a part of the criminal
process, parole denial is not resentencing and new findings of fact are not
required. Parole is nevertheless seen as an "integral part" of the penological
system, which in turn is directly related to, and often the end result of, the
criminal process. The Board of Parole, considering the same factors as a
sentencing judge, does pass on issues of fact. Additionally, sentencing and
parole decisionmaking are similar in that both are, in essence, dispositional,
rather than adjudicative, and both involve delicate and perhaps sophisticated
judgments which require a weighing of non-legal, imprecise factors.
The courts have recognized the importance and relevance of
lawyer's skills of investigation, verification of evidence, and factual
distinction in reaching [sentencing] decisions. There is thus little
justification for judicial reasoning that currently affords counsel at
sentencing but denies it at parole hearings.123
It may well be that parole decisionmaking can be validly distinguished from
sentencing because the former is not part of the criminal process. But the necessity
for having an effective advocate in both situations is the same. The essential
similarity in all respects of the two hearings logically compels that the presence of
an advocate in parole release decisionmaking be accorded parole applicants.
Access to adverse information
The Board of Parole consistently argues that allowing inmates to see
reports or documents unfavorable to their parole applications would have
two unfortunate results: (1) Persons submitting information to the Board
might feel inhibited if the inmates were given free access to such
information. Thus, all important data might not be given to the hearing
examiners. (2) Some reports, in the hands of inmates, could be
counterproductive to rehabilitation and prison discipline' 24 Both objections
pointed to by the Board are valid. But obviously all information or reports
need not be withheld on these bases. Just as obviously a parole applicant
cannot respond to information of which he has no knowledge and he
cannot effectively argue why he should be paroled if the hearing examiners
have access to information which the inmate is unable to refute. 2 5
Although case workers and other prison officials might temper their
remarks in reports to the Board of Parole if prisoners were allowed to review them,
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so might improper or unsubstantiated material be deleted. To the extent that
the author of a report may be called upon to verify his facts, he will be
careful to ensure that his observations are based in truth. It is, in the final
analysis, a value judgment: Which is more likely to serve the policies of
parole and its decisionmaking process (a likelihood of no further criminal
activity, society's safety, and fair and accurate parole decisions): secrecy or
openness?
The second fear of the Board is that access to this information might
cause problems within the penal institution. Information which the prisoner
cannot understand, like a psychological profile, or which could spark a
violent reaction or retaliatory measures on the part of a parole applicant,
such as a report from a fellow inmate of violations of institutional
regulations which can be verified independently, may be withheld. The
important point, however, is that there must be some check on the veracity
of information considered by the hearing examiners. And one of the best
means is to allow a parole applicant to study the information so that he
will have an opportunity to respond.
Several courts have considered this issue and have generally denied
prisoner access to such information.'26 Menechino v. Oswald,127 the leading
case in this area and often cited as authority, reasoned that since the Board
was not the inmate's adversary, did not resolve issues of fact, and was
concerned with numerous non-legal factors, an inmate could not obtain this
information prior to the parole release hearing. However, Menechino was
pre-Morrissey v. Brewer,128 and has since been distinguished as a right to
counsel and cross-examination case.129 United States ex rel. Johnson v.
Chairman of New York State Board of Parole'30 did not expressly overrule
Menechino, but did incorporate some of Morrissey's minimal due process
safeguards - one of which is access to adverse information (see also Wolff
v. McDonnell 3') - into the parole release decisionmaking process.
The Administrative Procedure Act, §556(d),132 also indicates that access by
an inmate to adverse information is to be permitted. This, of course, is
independent of the requirements of §554,133 from which the Board was
excluded by Hyser v. Reed.'3 4 King v. United States' 35 other cases construing
the applicability of the APA to the Board, 36 and most specifically National
Prison Project v. Sigler,'37 strongly suggest that Hyser is no longer
applicable; the Board's actions would be almost entirely subject to the
dictates of the Act and that access to this information must be provided parole
applicants.
Challenge to information in Board files
If an inmate is to challenge information before the Board, he must have
prior access to it. And if he is given access, it does him little good if he is
unable to challenge or question the information. The Board's objections to
allowing challenges is, again, rooted in considerations of time and efficiency.
But due process 38 and the Administrative Procedure Act 39 require that the
Board permit parole applicants to rebut or challenge adverse information.
The opportunity for such challenge must be a part of the parole release
decisionmaking process if Board decisions are to be accurate, fair, and serve
the interests of all parties concerned.
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Thus a parole denial may successfully be challenged on the basis that
certain fundamental procedural protections were not accorded a parole
applicant, i.e., that his hearing was, constitutionally or statutorily,
inadequate. Another means of attack is the sufficiency of reasons given for a
denial of parole.
Sufficiency of reasons
An attack upon the reasons for a denial of parole begins, as it ends,
with the Board's Guidelines. These Guidelines, by means of a ranking of
offense severity and offender characteristics, or "salient factors", determine
the "customary range of time to be served before release". 40 Offense severity,
rated from "low" to "greatest", is, theoretically at least, based on a
legislative judgment of just how serious any given criminal offense is to be
viewed. The salient factors are intended to give the Board a rough
approximation of the likelihood of success on parole. The Board, after
totaling a salient factor score, on a scale of zero to eleven, coordinates the
offender characteristic score with the offense committed.
The Guidelines were adopted to meet the criticism that the Board acted
arbitrarily, that its decisionmaking process was utterly devoid of structure,
and that its mode of operation was not conducive to inmate rehabilitation.' 4 '
Thus in response, the Board has attempted
[t]o establish a national paroling policy, promote a more consistent
exercise of discretion, and enable fairer and more equitable
decisionmaking without removing individual case considera-
tion. 142
By and large, the judiciary has viewed the Board's effort with approval, 43
thus accepting the validity of the Guidelines. That they may be unlawful
will be considered below, but first, challenges of denials, within the
framework utilized by the Board, will be surveyed.
If the Guidelines are accepted as valid, an inmate whom the Guidelines
indicate is not yet ready for parole release perhaps must be satisfied 44 with
the "boiler-plate language"' 4 5 of the Guidelines:
(1) Release at this time would depreciate the seriousness of the
offense committed and would thus be incompatible with the welfare
of society.
(2) There does not appear to be a reasonable probability at this
time that the prisoner would live and remain at liberty without
violating the law.
(3) The prisoner has (a serious) (repeated) disciplinary infraction(s)
in the institution.
(4) Additional institutional treatment is required to enhance the
prisoner's capacity to lead a law-abiding life.'"
The above reasons, from the Board's regulations, are acceptable only if the
Guidelines are valid and the parole applicant' s time served is not equivalent
to that which is "customary". These reasons, however, are not sufficient for
one detained longer than indicated by the Guidelines.4 7 Whether viewed as
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an abuse of discretion,'48 failure to adhere to its own rules,' 49 or an arbitrary
action,150 the Board must justify all continuances which result in
incarceration in excess of the Guideline period.
For an inmate not yet within the Guidelines, a denial may be attached if
the hearing was procedurally inadequate (as discussed above), or if the
hearing examiners relied on incorrect or inadequate information.' 5 ' And it
may well be that the "boilerplate" language is not, in fact, sufficient and
that the Board must be explicit and detailed.'5 ' The reasoning underlying
this position is that such reasons, as contained in the Guidelines, provide no
guidance to inmates who would hope to rehabilitate themselves. But if
rehabilitation remains one important function of parole, a serious question
arises regarding the validity of the Guidelines.
On its face, the Guidelines purport to establish a national sentencing
policy, remove the disparity occasioned by varying severity among trial
judges, and import incapacitation and retribution into the parole system.
These goals can be demonstrated to be both a departure from Congress' will,
as expressed in 18 U.S.C. §4203, and unconstitutional.
The Guidelines, in effect, remove sentencing from the province of the
trial court. The judge's intent can be and is completely frustrated and
rendered superfluous by the Board's current policy. The Guidelines do not
account for length or type of sentence, but look to severity of crime. If such
a drastic change is to be forced upon our criminal justice system, it is for
the legislature to effect through explicit action.
The Guidelines eschew rehabilitation as a factor in determining when
parole should be granted. The criteria utilized by the Board are the facts
known to the trial court at sentencing and remain roughly static throughout
an imate's incarceration. Additionally the Guidelines do not consider an
inmate as an individual - only as an offender of a given class. Recent
cases'" indicate that a sentencing court or the Board of Parole, in Youth
Correction Act cases, employing a "fixed and mechanical approach" 54 in
determining the length of sentence, "rather than a careful appraisal of the
variable components relevant to the sentence based upon an individual
basis"156 have acted in an unlawful fashion. The Congressional mandate to
the Board of Parole strongly suggests that a similar approach by the Board
in making normal parole release decisions, as evidenced by its Guidelines, is
at least "questionable"' 5 7 and perhaps invalid.
The two bases of the Guidelines - salient factor score and offense
severity - are arbitrary and capricious and, hence, unconstitutional. The
salient factor procedure is unconcerned with an inmate's institutional
behavior - the only factor unknown to the judge at sentencing. Its selection
of, and dependence on, past criminal activity is simply arbitrary. Although
such criteria may be justified as being partially determinative of success on
parole, other rehabilitative factors must be considered to make the salient
factor score valid.
Finally, the offense severity criteria are based not on the United States
Code, but on California's penal code. 5 7 As a result, offenses are not
categorized by severity of punishment, but on a particular state's judgment
of which offenses are more or less important. And several federal offenses are
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either omitted from the Guideline list, or can be inserted at any of several
levels. Thus the Board can and does exercise considerable discretion and is
able to disguise abuses by placing offenses in whichever category suits the
hearing examiner's sentiments regarding length of incarceration. 58
In sum, it is to be noted that the Board of Parole, in its exercise of
considerable discretion, is not immune from judicial review. The
justifications for not according procedural protections to parole applicants
are not persuasive and close judicial scrutiny of the Board's present
procedures may well invalidate them.
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